Provable Self-Play Algorithms for Competitive Reinforcement Learning by Bai, Yu & Jin, Chi
ar
X
iv
:2
00
2.
04
01
7v
3 
 [c
s.L
G]
  9
 Ju
l 2
02
0
Provable Self-Play Algorithms for Competitive Reinforcement
Learning
Yu Bai∗ Chi Jin†
July 10, 2020
Abstract
Self-play, where the algorithm learns by playing against itself without requiring any direct supervi-
sion, has become the new weapon in modern Reinforcement Learning (RL) for achieving superhuman
performance in practice. However, the majority of exisiting theory in reinforcement learning only ap-
plies to the setting where the agent plays against a fixed environment; it remains largely open whether
self-play algorithms can be provably effective, especially when it is necessary to manage the explo-
ration/exploitation tradeoff. We study self-play in competitive reinforcement learning under the setting
of Markov games, a generalization of Markov decision processes to the two-player case. We introduce
a self-play algorithm—Value Iteration with Upper/Lower Confidence Bound (VI-ULCB)—and show
that it achieves regret O˜(√T ) after playing T steps of the game, where the regret is measured by the
agent’s performance against a fully adversarial opponent who can exploit the agent’s strategy at any
step. We also introduce an explore-then-exploit style algorithm, which achieves a slightly worse regret
of O˜(T 2/3), but is guaranteed to run in polynomial time even in the worst case. To the best of our knowl-
edge, our work presents the first line of provably sample-efficient self-play algorithms for competitive
reinforcement learning.
1 Introduction
This paper studies competitive reinforcement learning (competitive RL), that is, reinforcement learning
with two or more agents taking actions simultaneously, but each maximizing their own reward. Compet-
itive RL is a major branch of the more general setting of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL),
with the specification that the agents have conflicting rewards (so that they essentially compete with each
other) yet can be trained in a centralized fashion (i.e. each agent has access to the other agents’ poli-
cies) (Crandall and Goodrich, 2005).
There are substantial recent progresses in competitive RL, in particular in solving hard multi-player
games such as GO (Silver et al., 2017), Starcraft (Vinyals et al., 2019), and Dota 2 (OpenAI, 2018). A key
highlight in their approaches is the successful use of self-play for achieving super-human performance in
absence of human knowledge or expert opponents. These self-play algorithms are able to learn a good
policy for all players from scratch through repeatedly playing the current policies against each other and
performing policy updates using these self-played game trajectories. The empirical success of self-play has
challenged the conventional wisdom that expert opponents are necessary for achieving good performance,
and calls for a better theoretical understanding.
In this paper, we take initial steps towards understanding the effectiveness of self-play algorithms in
competitive RL from a theoretical perspective. We focus on the special case of two-player zero-sum Markov
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Table 1: Regret and PAC guarantees of the Algorithms in this paper for zero-sum Markov games.
Settings Algorithm Regret PAC Runtime
General
Markov Game
VI-ULCB (Theorem 2) O˜(
√
H3S2ABT ) O˜(H4S2AB/ǫ2) PPAD-complete
VI-explore (Theorem 5) O˜((H5S2ABT 2)1/3) O˜(H5S2AB/ǫ2)
Polynomial
Mirror Descent (H = 1)
(Rakhlin and Sridharan,
2013)
O˜(√S(A+B)T ) O˜(S(A+ B)/ǫ2)
Turn-Based
Markov Game
VI-ULCB (Corollary 4) O˜(
√
H3S2(A+B)T ) O˜(H4S2(A+B)/ǫ2)
Mirror Descent (H = 2)
(Theorem 10)
O˜(√S(A+B)T ) O˜(S(A+ B)/ǫ2)
Both Lower Bound (Corollary 7) Ω(
√
H2S(A+B)T ) Ω(H2S(A+B)/ǫ2) -
games (Shapley, 1953; Littman, 1994), a generalization of Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) to the two-
player setting. In a Markov game, the two players share states, play actions simultaneously, and observe the
same reward. However, one player aims to maximize the return while the other aims to minimize it. This set-
ting covers the majority of two-player games including GO (there is a single reward of {+1,−1} at the end
of the game indicating which player has won), and also generalizes zero-sum matrix games (von Neumann,
1928)—an important game-theoretic problem—into the multi-step (RL) case.
More concretely, the goal of this paper is to design low-regret algorithms for solving episodic two-player
Markov games in the general setting (Kearns and Singh, 2002), that is, the algorithm is allowed to play the
game for a fixed amount of episodes using arbitrary policies, and its performance is measured in terms of
the regret. We consider a strong notion of regret for two-player zero-sum games, where the performance
of the deployed policies in each episode is measured against the best response for that policy, which can
be different in different episodes. Such a regret bound measures the algorithm’s ability in managing the
exploration and exploitation tradeoff against fully adaptive opponents, and can directly translate to other
types of guarantees such as the PAC sample complexity bound.
Our contribution This paper introduces the first line of provably sample-efficient self-play algorithms for
zero-sum Markov game under no restrictive assumptions. Concretely,
• We introduce the first self-play algorithm with O˜(√T ) regret for zero-sum Markov games. More
specifically, it achieves O˜(
√
H3S2ABT ) regret in the general case, where H is the length of the
game, S is the number of states, A,B are the number of actions for each player, and T is the total
number of steps played. In special case of turn-based games, it achieves O˜(√H3S2(A+B)T ) regret
with guaranteed polynomial runtime.
• We also introduce an explore-then-exploit style algorithm. It has guaranteed polynomial runtime in
the general setting of zero-sum Markov games, with a slightly worse O˜(T 2/3) regret.
• We raise the open question about the optimal dependency of the regret on S,A,B. We provide a lower
bound Ω(
√
S(A+B)T ), and show that the lower bound can be achieved in simple case of two-step
turn-based games by a mirror descent style algorithm.
Above results are summarized in Table 1.
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1.1 Related Work
There is a fast-growing body of work on multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). Many of them achieve
striking empirical performance, or attack MARL in the cooperative setting, where agents are optimizing
for a shared or similar reward. We refer the readers to several recent surveys for these results (see e.g.
Bus¸oniu et al., 2010; Nguyen et al., 2018; OroojlooyJadid and Hajinezhad, 2019; Zhang et al., 2019). In the
rest of this section we focus on theoretical results related to competitive RL.
Markov games Markov games (or stochastic games) is proposed as a mathematical model for compeitive
RL back in the early 1950s (Shapley, 1953). There is a long line of classical work since then on solving
this problem (see e.g. Littman, 1994, 2001; Hu and Wellman, 2003; Hansen et al., 2013). They design algo-
rithms, possibly with runtime guarantees, to find optimal policies in Markov games when both the transition
matrix and reward are known, or in the asymptotic setting where number of data goes to infinity. These
results do not directly apply to the non-asymptotic setting where the transition and reward are unknown and
only a limited amount of data are available for estimating them.
A few recent work tackles self-play algorithms for Markov games in the non-asymptotic setting, working
under either structural assumptions about the game or stronger sampling oracles. Wei et al. (2017) propose
an upper confidence algorithm for stochastic games and prove that a self-play style algorithm finds ǫ-optimal
policies in poly(1/ǫ) samples. Jia et al. (2019); Sidford et al. (2019) study turn-based stochastic games—
a special case of general Markov games, and propose algorithms with near-optimal sample complexity.
However, both lines of work make strong assumptions—on either the structure of Markov games or how
we access data—that are not always true in practice. Specifically, Wei et al. (2017) assumes no matter
what strategy one agent sticks to, the other agent can always reach all states by playing a certain policy,
and Jia et al. (2019); Sidford et al. (2019) assume access to simulators (or generative models) which enable
the agent to directly sample transition and reward information for any state-action pair. These assumptions
greatly alleviate the challenge in exploration. In contrast, our results apply to general Markov games without
further structural assumptions, and our algorithms have built-in mechanisms for solving the challenge in the
exploration-exploitation tradeoff.
Finally, we note that classical R-MAX algorithm (Brafman and Tennenholtz, 2002) does not make re-
strictive assumptions. It also has provable guarantees even when playing against the adversarial opponent
in Markov game. However, the theoretical guarantee in Brafman and Tennenholtz (2002) is weaker than the
standard regret, and does not directly imply any self-play algorithm with regret bound in our setting (See
Section E for more details).
Adversarial MDP Another line of related work focuses on provable algorithms against adversarial oppo-
nents in MDP. Most work in this line considers the setting with adversarial rewards (see e.g. Zimin and Neu,
2013; Rosenberg and Mansour, 2019; Jin et al., 2019). These results do not direcly imply provable self-play
algorithms in our setting, because the adversarial opponent in Markov games can affect both the reward
and the transition. There exist a few works that tackle both adversarial transition functions and adversar-
ial rewards (Yu and Mannor, 2009; Cheung et al., 2019; Lykouris et al., 2019). In particular, Lykouris et al.
(2019) considers a stochastic problem with C episodes arbitrarily corrupted and obtain O(C√T + C2) re-
gret. When applying these results to Markov games with an adversarial opponent, C can be Θ(T ) without
further assumptions, which makes the bound vacuous.
Single-agent RL There is an extensive body of research on the sample efficiency of reinforcement learning
in the single agent setting (see e.g. Jaksch et al., 2010; Osband et al., 2014; Azar et al., 2017; Dann et al.,
2017; Strehl et al., 2006; Jin et al., 2018), which are studied under the model of Markov decision process—
a special case of Markov games. For the tabular episodic setting with nonstationary dynamics and no
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simulators, the best regrets achieved by existing model-based and model-free algorithms are O˜(
√
H2SAT )
(Azar et al., 2017) and O˜(
√
H3SAT ) (Jin et al., 2018), respectively, where S is the number of states, A is
the number of actions, H is the length of each episode, and T is the total number of steps played. Both
of them (nearly) match the minimax lower bound Ω(
√
H2SAT ) (Jaksch et al., 2010; Osband and Van Roy,
2016; Jin et al., 2018).
2 Preliminaries
In this paper, we consider zero-sum Markov Games (MG) (Shapley, 1953; Littman, 1994), which also
known as stochastic games in the literature. Zero-sum Markov games are generalization of standard Markov
Decision Processes (MDP) into the two-player setting, in which the max-player seeks to maximize the total
return and the min-player seeks to minimize the total return.
Formally, we consider tabular episodic zero-sum Markov games of the form MG(H,S,A,B,P, r),
where
• H is the number of steps in each episode.
• S = ∪h∈[H+1]Sh, and Sh is the set of states at step h, withmaxh∈[H+1] |Sh| ≤ S.
• A = ∪h∈[H]Ah, and Ah is the set of actions of the max-player at step h, withmaxh∈[H] |Ah| ≤ A.
• B = ∪h∈[H]Bh, and Bh is the set of actions of the min-player at step h, withmaxh∈[H] |Bh| ≤ B.
• P = {Ph}h∈[H] is a collection of transition matrices, so that Ph(·|s, a, b) gives the distribution over
states if action pair (a, b) is taken for state s at step h.
• r = {rh}h∈[H] is a collection of reward functions, and rh : Sh×Ah×Bh → [0, 1] is the deterministic
reward function at step h. Note that we are assuming that rewards are in [0, 1] for normalization. 1
In each episode of this MG, an initial state s1 is picked arbitrarily by an adversary. Then, at each step
h ∈ [H], both players observe state sh ∈ Sh, pick the action ah ∈ Ah, bh ∈ Bh simultaneously, receive
reward rh(sh, ah, bh), and then transition to the next state sh+1 ∼ Ph(·|sh, ah, bh). The episode ends when
sH+1 is reached.
Policy and value function A policy µ of the max-player is a collection of H functions
{
µh : S →
∆Ah
}
h∈[H]
, where ∆Ah is the probability simplex over action set Ah. Similarly, a policy ν of the min-
player is a collection of H functions
{
νh : S → ∆Bh
}
h∈[H]
. We use the notation µh(a|s) and νh(b|s) to
present the probability of taking action a or b for state s at step h under policy µ or ν respectively. We
use V µ,νh : Sh → R to denote the value function at step h under policy µ and ν, so that V µ,νh (s) gives the
expected cumulative rewards received under policy µ and ν, starting from sh = s, until the end of the
episode:
V µ,νh (s) := Eµ,ν
[
H∑
h′=h
rh′(sh′ , ah′ , bh′)
∣∣∣∣∣ sh = s
]
.
We also define Qµ,νh : Sh ×Ah × Bh → R to denote Q-value function at step h so that Qµ,νh (s, a) gives the
cumulative rewards received under policy µ and ν, starting from sh = s, ah = a, bh = b, till the end of the
1While we study deterministic reward functions for notational simplicity, our results generalize to randomized reward functions.
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episode:
Qµ,νh (s, a, b) := Eµ,ν
[
H∑
h′=h
rh′(sh′ , ah′ , bh′)
∣∣∣∣∣ sh = s, ah = a, bh = b
]
.
For simplicity, we use notation of operator Ph so that [PhV ](s, a, b) := Es′∼Ph(·|s,a,b)V (s
′) for any value
function V . By definition of value functions, for all (s, a, b, h) ∈ Sh×Ah×Bh× [H], we have the Bellman
equation
Qµ,νh (s, a, b) = (rh + PhV
µ,ν
h+1)(s, a, b), (1)
V µ,νh (s) =
∑
a,b
µh(a|s)νh(b|s)Qµ,νh (s, a, b). (2)
where we define V µ,νH+1(s) = 0 for all s ∈ SH+1
Best response and regret We now define the notion of best response and review some basic properties
of it (cf. (Filar and Vrieze, 2012)), which will motivate our definition of the regret in two-player Markov
games. For any max-player strategy µ, there exists a best response of the min-player, which is a policy
ν†(µ) satisfying V
µ,ν†(µ)
h (s) = infν V
µ,ν
h (s) for any (s, h). For simplicity, we denote V
µ,†
h := V
µ,ν†(µ)
h . By
symmetry, we can define the best response of the max-player µ†(ν), and define V †,νh . The value functions
V µ,†h and V
†,ν
h satisfy the following Bellman optimality equations:
V µ,†h (s) = infν∈∆Bh
∑
a,b
µh(a|s)ν(b)Qµ,†h (s, a, b), (3)
V †,νh (s) = sup
µ∈∆Ah
∑
a,b
µ(a)νh(b|s)Q†,νh (s, a, b). (4)
It is further known that there exist policies µ⋆, ν⋆ that are optimal against the best responses of the opponent:
V µ
⋆,†
h (s) = sup
µ
V µ,†h (s),
V †,ν
⋆
h (s) = infν
V †,νh (s),
for all (s, h).
It is also known that, for any (s, h), the minimax theorem holds:
sup
µ
inf
ν
V µ,νh (s) = V
µ⋆,ν⋆
h (s) = infν
sup
µ
V µ,νh (s).
Therefore, the optimal strategies (µ⋆, ν⋆) are also the Nash Equilibrium for the Markov game. Based on
this, it is sensible to measure the suboptimality of any pair of policies (µˆ, νˆ) using the gap between their per-
formance and the performance of the optimal strategy when playing against the best responses respectively,
i.e., [
V †,νˆh (s)− infν V
†,ν
h (s)
]
+
[
sup
µ
V µ,†h (s)− V µˆ,†h (s)
]
= V †,νˆh (s)− V µˆ,†h (s). (5)
We make this formal in the following definition of the regret.
Definition 1 (Regret). For any algorithm that plays the Markov game for K episodes with (potentially
adversarial) starting state sk1 for each episode k = 1, 2, . . . ,K, the regret is defined as
Regret(K) =
K∑
k=1
[
V †,ν
k
1 (s
k
1)− V µ
k ,†
1 (s
k
1)
]
,
where (µk, νk) denote the policies deployed by the algorithm in the k-th episode.
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We note that as a unique feature of self-play algorithms, the learner is playing against herself, and thus
chooses strategies for both max-player and min-player at each episode.
2.1 Turn-based games
In zero-sum Markov games, each step involves the two players playing simultaneously and independently.
It is a general framework, which contains a very important special case—turn-based games. (Shapley, 1953;
Jia et al., 2019).
The main feature of a turn-based game is that only one player is taking actions in each step; in other
words, the max and min player take turns to play the game. Formally, a turn-based game can be defined
through a partition of steps [H] into two sets Hmax and Hmin, where Hmax and Hmin denote the sets of
steps the max-player and the min-player choose the actions respectively, which satisfies Hmax ∩Hmin = ∅
and Hmax ∪ Hmin = [H]. As a special example, GO is a turn-based game in which the two players play in
alternate turns, i.e.
Hmax = {1, 3, . . . ,H − 1} and Hmin = {2, 4, . . . ,H}
Mathematically, we can specialize general zero-sum Markov games to turn-based games by restricting
Ah = {˚a} for all h ∈ Hmin, and Bh = {˚b} for all h ∈ Hmax, where a˚ and b˚ are special dummy actions.
Consequently, in those steps, Ah or Bh has only a single action as its element, i.e. the corresponding player
can not affect the game in those steps. A consequence of this specialization is that the Nash Equilibria for
turn-based games are pure strategies (i.e. deterministic policies) (Shapley, 1953), similar as in one-player
MDPs. This is not always true for general Markov games.
3 Main Results
In this section, we present our algorithm and main theorems. In particular, our algorithm is the first self-play
algorithm that achieves O˜(√T ) regret in Markov Games. We describe the algorithm in Section 3.1, and
present its theoretical guarantee for general Markov games in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, we show that
when specialized to turn-based games, the regret and runtime of our algorithm can be further improved.
3.1 Algorithm description
To solve zero-sumMarkov games, the main idea is to extend the celebrated UCB (Upper Confidence Bounds)
principle—an algorithmic principle that achieves provably efficient exploration in bandits (Auer et al., 2002)
and single-agent RL (Azar et al., 2017; Jin et al., 2018)—to the two-player setting. Recall that in single-
agent RL, the provably efficient UCBVI algorithm (Azar et al., 2017) proceeds as
Algorithm (UCBVI for single-player RL): Compute
{
Quph (s, a) : h, s, a
}
based on estimated
transition and optimistic (upper) estimate of reward, then play one episode with the greedy
policy with respect to Qup.
Regret bounds for UCBVI is then established by showing and utilizing the fact thatQup remains an optimistic
(upper) estimate of the optimal Q⋆ throughout execution of the algorithm.
In zero-sum games, the two player have conflicting goals: the max-player seeks to maximize the return
and the min-player seeks to minimize the return. Therefore, it seems natural here to maintain two sets of Q
estimates, one upper bounding the true value and one lower bounding the true value, so that each player can
play optimistically with respect to her own goal. We summarize this idea into the following proposal.
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Proposal (Naive two-player extension of UCBVI): Compute
{
Quph (s, a, b), Q
low
h (s, a, b)
}
based
on estimated transition and {upper, lower} estimates of rewards, then play one episode where
the max-player (µ) is greedy with respect to Qup and the min-player (ν) is greedy with respect
to Qlow.
However, the above proposal is not yet a well-defined algorithm: a greedy strategy µ with respect to Qup
requires the knowledge of how the other player chooses b, and vice versa. Therefore, what we really want
is not that “µ is greedy with respect to Qup”, but rather that “µ is greedy with respect to Qup when the other
player uses ν”, and vice versa. In other words, we rather desire that (µ, ν) are jointly greedy with respect to
(Qup, Qlow).
Our algorithm concretizes such joint greediness precisely, building on insights from one-step matrix
games: we choose (µh, νh) to be the Nash equilibrium for the general-sum game in which the payoff matrix
for the max player is Qup and for the min player is Qlow. In other words, both player have their own
payoff matrix (and they are not equal), but they jointly determine their policies. Formally, we let (µ, ν) be
determined as
(µh(·|s), νh(·|s)) = NASH GENERAL SUM(Quph (s, ·, ·), Qlowh (s, ·, ·))
for all (h, s), where NASH GENERAL SUM is a subroutine that takes two matrices P,Q ∈ RA×B, and
returns the Nash equilibrium (φ,ψ) ∈ ∆A ×∆B for general sum game, which satisfies
φ⊤Pψ = max
φ˜
φ˜⊤Pψ, φ⊤Qψ = min
ψ˜
φ⊤Qψ˜. (6)
Such an equilibrium is guaranteed to exist due to the seminal work of Nash (1951), and is computable by al-
gorithms such as the Lemke-Howson algorithm (Lemke and Howson, 1964). With the NASH GENERAL SUM sub-
routine in hand, our algorithm can be briefly described as
Our Algorithm (VI-ULCB): Compute
{
Quph (s, a, b), Q
low
h (s, a, b)
}
based on estimated tran-
sition and {upper, lower} estimates of rewards, along the way determining policies (µ, ν) by
running the NASH GENERAL SUM subroutine on (Qup, Qlow). Play one episode according to
(µ, ν).
The full algorithm is described in Algorithm 1.
3.2 Guarantees for General Markov Games
We are now ready to present our main theorem.
Theorem 2 (Regret bound for VI-ULCB). For zero-sum Markov games, Algorithm 1 (with choice of bonus
βt = c
√
H2Sι/t for large absolute constant c) achieves regret
Regret(K) ≤ O
(√
H3S2
[
max
h∈[H]
AhBh
]
T ι
)
≤ O
(√
H3S2ABTι
)
with probability at least 1− p, where ι = log(SABT/p).
We defer the proof of Theorem 2 into Appendix A.1.
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Algorithm 1 Value Iteration with Upper-Lower Confidence Bound (VI-ULCB)
1: Initialize: for any (s, a, b, h), Quph (s, a, b)← H , Qlowh (s, a, b)← 0, Nh(s, a, b)← 0, Nh(s, a, b, s′)←
0.
2: for episode k = 1, . . . ,K do
3: for step h = H,H − 1, . . . , 1 do
4: for (s, a, b) ∈ Sh ×Ah × Bh do
5: t = Nh(s, a, b);
6: Quph (s, a, b)← min{rˆh(s, a, b) + [P̂hV uph+1](s, a, b) + βt,H}
7: Qlowh (s, a, b)← max{rˆh(s, a, b) + [P̂hV lowh+1](s, a, b)− βt, 0}
8: for s ∈ Sh do
9: (µh(·|s), νh(·|s))← NASH GENERAL SUM(Quph (s, ·, ·), Qlowh (s, ·, ·))
10: V uph (s)←
∑
a,b µh(a|s)νh(b|s)Quph (s, a, b).
11: V lowh (s)←
∑
a,b µh(a|s)νh(b|s)Qlowh (s, a, b).
12: Receive s1.
13: for step h = 1, . . . ,H do
14: Take action ah ∼ µh(sh), bh ∼ νh(sh).
15: Observe reward rh and next state sh+1.
16: Nh(sh, ah, bh)← Nh(sh, ah, bh) + 1.
17: Nh(sh, ah, bh, sh+1)← Nh(sh, ah, bh, sh+1) + 1
18: Pˆh(·|sh, ah, bh)← Nh(sh, ah, bh, ·)
Nh(sh, ah, bh)
.
19: rˆh(sh, ah, bh)← rh.
Optimism in the face of uncertainty and best response An implication of Theorem 2 is that a low
regret can be achieved via self-play, i.e. the algorithm plays with itself and does not need an expert as
its opponent. This is intriguing because the regret is measured in terms of the suboptimality against the
worst-case opponent:
Regret(K) =
K∑
k=1
[
V †,ν
k
1 (s
k
1)− V µ
k,†
1 (s
k
1)
]
=
K∑
k=1
[
max
µ
V µ,ν
k
1 (s
k
1)− V µ
k ,νk
1 (s
k
1)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
gap between µk and the best response to νk
+
[
V µ
k,νk
1 (s
k
1)−minν V
µk ,ν
1 (s
k
1)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
gap between νk and the best response to µk
.
(Note that this decomposition of the regret has a slightly different form from (5).) Therefore, Theorem 2
demonstrates that self-play can protect against fully adversarial opponent even when such a strong opponent
is not explicitly available.
The key technical reason enabling such a guarantee is that our Q estimates are optimistic in the face of
both the uncertainty of the game, as well as the best response from the opponent. More precisely, we show
that the (Qup, Qlow) in Algorithm 1 satisfy with high probability
Qup,kh (s, a, b) ≥ sup
µ
Qµ,ν
k
h (s, a, b) ≥ infν Q
µk ,ν
h (s, a, b) ≥ Qlow,kh (s, a, b)
for all (s, a, b, h, k), where (Qup,k, Qlow,k) denote the running (Qup, Qlow) at the beginning of the k-th
episode (Lemma 11). In constrast, such a guarantee (and consequently the regret bound) is not achiev-
able if the upper and lower estimates are only guaranteed to {upper, lower} bound the values of the Nash
equilibrium.
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Translation to PAC bound Our regret bound directly implies a PAC sample complexity bound for learn-
ing near-equilibrium policies, based on an online-to-batch conversion. We state this in the following Corol-
lary, and defer the proof to Appendix A.2.
Corollary 3 (PAC bound for VI-ULCB). Suppose the initial state of Markov game is fixed at s1, then
there exists a pair of (randomized) policies (µ̂, ν̂) derived through the VI-ULCB algorithm such that with
probability at least 1− p (over the randomness in the trajectories) we have
Eµ̂,ν̂
[
V †,ν̂(s1)− V µ̂,†(s1)
]
≤ ǫ,
as soon as the number of episodes K ≥ Ω(H4S2ABι/ǫ2), where ι = log(HSAB/(pǫ)), and the expecta-
tion is over the randomization in (µ̂, ν̂).
Runtime of Algorithm 1 Algorithm 1 involves the NASH GENERAL SUM subroutine for computing the
Nash equilibrium of a general sum matrix game. However, it is known that the computational complexity for
approximating2 such an equilibrium is PPAD-complete (Daskalakis, 2013), a complexity class conjectured
to not enjoy polynomial or quasi-polynomial time algorithms. Therefore, Algorithm 1 is strictly speaking
not a polynomial time algorithm, despite of being rather sample-efficient.
We note however that there exists practical implementations of the subroutine such as the Lemke-
Howson algorithm (Lemke and Howson, 1964) that can usually find the solution efficiently. We will further
revisit the computational issue in Section 4, in which we design a computationally efficient algorithm for
zero-sum games with a slightly worse O˜(T 2/3) regret.
3.3 Guarantees for Turn-based Markov Games
We now instantiate Theorem 2 on turn-based games (introduced in Section 2.1), in which the same algorithm
enjoys better regret guarantee and polynomial runtime. Recall that in turn-based games, for all h, we have
either Ah = 1 or Bh = 1, therefore given maxhAh ≤ A and maxhBh ≤ B we have
max
h
AhBh ≤ max {A,B} ≤ A+B,
and thus by Theorem 2 the regret of Algorithm 1 on turn-based games is bounded byO(√H3S2(A+B)T ).
Further, since either Ah = 1 or Bh = 1, all the NASH GENERAL SUM subroutines reduce to vector
games rather than matrix games, and can be trivially implemented in polynomial (indeed linear) time. In-
deed, suppose the payoff matrices in (6) has dimensionsP,Q ∈ RA×1, then NASH GENERAL SUM reduces
to finding φ ∈ ∆A and ψ ≡ 1 such that
φ⊤P = max
φ˜
φ˜⊤P
(the other side is trivialized as ψ ∈ ∆1 has only one choice), which is solved at φ = ea⋆ where a⋆ =
argmaxa∈[A]Pa. The situation is similar if P,Q ∈ R1×B .
We summarize the above results into the following corollary.
Corollary 4 (Regret bound for VI-ULCB on turn-based games). For turn-based zero-sum Markov games,
Algorithm 1 has runtime poly(S,A,B, T ) and achieves regret bound O(√H3S2(A+B)T ι) with proba-
bility at least 1− p, where ι = log(SABT/p).
2More precisely, our proof requires the subroutine to find a (1 + 1/H)-multiplicative approximation of the equilibrium, that
is, for payoff matrices P,Q ∈ RA×B we desire vectors φ ∈ ∆A and ψ ∈ ∆B such that maxφ˜ φ˜
⊤Pψ − minψ˜ φ
⊤Qψ˜ ≤
(1 + 1/H)φ⊤(P−Q)ψ.
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Algorithm 2 Value Iteration after Exploration (VI-Explore)
1: (Pˆ, rˆ)← REWARD FREE EXPLORATION(ǫ).
2: VH(s)← 0 for any s ∈ SH .
3: for step h = H − 1, . . . , 1 do
4: for (s, a, b) ∈ S ×A× B do
5: Qh(s, a, b)← rˆh(s, a, b) + [PˆhVh+1](s, a, b).
6: for s ∈ S do
7: (µˆh(·|s), νˆh(·|s))←
NASH ZERO SUM(Qh(s, ·, ·)).
8: for all remaining episodes do
9: Play the game with policy (µˆ, νˆ).
4 Computationally Efficient Algorithm
In this section, we show that the computational issue of Algorithm 1 is not intrinsic to the problem: there
exists a sublinear regret algorithm for general zero-sum Markov games that has a guaranteed polynomial
runtime, with regret scaling as O(T 2/3), slightly worse than that of Algorithm 1. Therefore, computational
efficiency can be achieved if one is willing to trade some statistical efficiency (sample complexity). For
simplicity, we assume in this section that the initial state s1 is fixed.
Value Iteration after Exploration At a high level, our algorithm follows an explore-then-exploit ap-
proach. We begin by running a (polynomial time) reward-free exploration procedure REWARD FREE EXPLORATION(ǫ)
on a small number of episodes, which queries the MDP and outputs an estimate (Pˆ, rˆ). Then, we run value
iteration on the empirical version of Markov game with transition Pˆ and reward rˆ, which finds its Nash
equilibrium (µˆ, νˆ). Finally, the algorithm simply plays the policy (µˆ, νˆ) for the remaining episodes. The
full algorithm is described in Algorithm 2 in the Appendix.
By “reward-free” exploration, we mean the procedure will not use any reward information to guide ex-
ploration. Instead, the procedure prioritize on visiting all possible states and gathering sufficient information
about their transition and rewards, so that (Pˆ, rˆ) are close to (P, r) in the sense that the Nash equilibria of
MG(Pˆ, rˆ) andMG(P, r) are close, whereMG(Pˆ, rˆ) denotes the Markov game with transition Pˆ and reward
rˆ.
This goal can be achieved by the following algorithm. For any fixed state s, we can create an artificial
reward r˜ defined as r˜(s, a, b) = 1 and r˜(s′, a, b) = 0 for any s′ 6= s, a and b. Then, we can treat C = A×B
as a new action set for a single agent, and run any standard reinforcement learning algorithm with PAC or
regret guarantees to find a near-optimal policy π˜ of MDP(H,S, C,P, r˜). It can be shown that the optimal
policy for this MDP is the policy that maximize the probability to reach state s. Therefore, by repeatedly
playing π˜, we can gather transition and reward information at state s as well as we can. Finally, we repeat
the routine above for all state s. See Appendix B for more details.
In this paper, we adapt the sharp treatments in Jin et al. (2020) which studies reward-free exploration in
the single-agent MDP setting, and provide following guarantees for the REWARD FREE EXPLORATION pro-
cedure.
Theorem 5 (PAC bound for VI-Explore). With probability at least 1−p, REWARD FREE EXPLORATION(ǫ)
runs for c(H5S2ABι/ǫ2+H7S4ABι3/ǫ) episodes with some large constant c, and ι = log(HSAB/(pǫ)),
and outputs (Pˆ, rˆ) such that the Nash equilibrium (µˆ, νˆ) of MG(Pˆ, rˆ) satisfies[
V †,ν̂(s1)− V µ̂,†(s1)
]
≤ ǫ.
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Importantly, such Nash equilibrium (µˆ, νˆ) of MG(Pˆ, rˆ) can be computed by Value Iteration (VI) using
Pˆ and rˆ. VI only calls NASH ZERO SUM subroutine, which takes a matrixQ ∈ RA×B and returns the Nash
equilibrium (φ,ψ) ∈ ∆A ×∆B for zero-sum game, which satisfies
max
φ˜
φ˜⊤Qψ = φ⊤Qψ = min
ψ˜
φ⊤Qψ˜. (7)
This problem can by solved efficiently (in polynomial time) by many existing algorithms designed for
convex-concave optimization (see, e.g. (Koller, 1994)), and does not suffer from the PPAD-completeness
that NASH GENERAL SUM does.
The PAC bound in Theorem 5 can be easily converted into a regret bound, which is presented as follows.
Corollary 6 (Polynomial time algorithm via explore-then-exploit). For zero-sum Markov games, with prob-
ability at least 1− p, Algorithm 2 runs in poly(S,A,B,H, T ) time, and achieves regret bound
O
(
(H5S2ABT 2ι)
1
3 +
√
H7S4ABTι3
)
,
where ι = log(SABT/p).
5 Towards the Optimal Regret
We investigate the tightness of our regret upper bounds in Theorem 2 and Corollary 4 through raising the
question of optimal regret in two-player Markov games, and making initial progresses on it by providing
lower bounds and new upper bounds in specific settings. Specifically, we ask an
Open question: What is the optimal regret for general Markov games (in terms of dependence on
(H,S,A,B))?
It is known that the (tight) regret lower bound for single-player MDPs isΩ(
√
SAT · poly(H)) (Azar et al.,
2017). By restricting two-player games to a single-player MDP (making the other player dummy), we im-
mediately have
Corollary 7 (Regret lower bound, corollary of Jaksch et al. (2010), Theorem 5). The regret3 for any algo-
rithm on turn-based games (and thus also general zero-sum games) is lower bounded byΩ(
√
H2S(A+B)T ).
Comparing this lower bound with the upper bound in Theorem 2 (O˜(√S2ABT · poly(H)) regret for
general games and O˜(√S2(A+B)T · poly(H)) regret for turn-based games), there are gaps in both the
S-dependence and the (A,B)-dependence.
Matching the lower bound on short-horizon games Towards closing the gap between lower and upper
bounds, we develop alternative algorithms in the special case where each player only plays once, i.e. one-
step general games with H = 1 and two-step turn-based games. In these cases, we show that there exists
mirror descent type algorithms that achieve an improved regret O˜(√S(A+B)T ) (and thus matching the
lower bounds), provided that we consider a weaker notion of the regret defined as
Definition 8 (Weak Regret). The weak regret for any algorithm that deploys policies (µk, νk) in episode k
is defined as
WeakRegret(K) := max
µ
K∑
k=1
V µ,ν
k
(sk1)−minν
K∑
k=1
V µ
k ,ν(sk1). (8)
3This also applies to the weak regret defined in (8).
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The difference in the weak regret is that it uses fixed opponents—as opposed to adaptive opponents—for
measuring the performance gap: the max is taken with respect to a fixed µ for all episodes k = 1, . . . ,K,
rather than a different µ for each episode. By definition, we have for any algorithm thatWeakRegret(K) ≤
Regret(K).
With the definition of the weak regret in hand, we now present our results for one-step games. Their
proofs can be found in Appendix C.
Theorem 9 (Weak regret for one-step simultaneous game, adapted from Rakhlin and Sridharan (2013)).
For one-step simultaneous games (H = 1), there exists a mirror descent type algorithm that achieves weak
regret bound WeakRegret(T ) ≤ O˜(√S(A+B)T ) with high probability.
Theorem 10 (Weak regret for two-step turn-based game). For one-step turn-based games (H = 2), there ex-
ists a mirror descent type algorithm that achieves weak regret boundWeakRegret(T ) ≤ O˜(√S(A+B)T )
with high probability.
Proof insights; bottleneck in multi-step case The improved regret bounds in Theorem 9 and 10 are
possible due to availability of unbiased estimates of counterfactual Q values, which in turn can be used
in mirror descent type algorithms with guarantees. Such unbiased estimates are only achievable in one-
step games as the two policies are “not intertwined” in a certain sense. In contrast, in multi-step games
(where each player plays more than once), such unbiased estimates of counterfactual Q values are no longer
available, and it is unclear how to construct a mirror descent algorithm there. We believe it would be an
important open question to close the gap in multi-step games (as well as the gap between regret and weak
regret) for a further understanding of exploration in games.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the sample complexity of finding the equilibrium policy in the setting of competitive
reinforcement learning, i.e. zero-sumMarkov games with two players. We designed a self-play algorithm for
zero-sum games and showed that it can efficiently find the Nash equilibrium policy in the exploration setting
through establishing a regret bound. Our algorithm—Value Iteration with Upper and Lower Confidence
Bounds—builds on a principled extension of UCB/optimism into the two-player case by constructing upper
and lower bounds on the value functions and iteratively solving general sum subgames.
Towards investigating the optimal runtime and sample complexity in two-player games, we provided
accompanying results showing that (1) the computational efficiency of our algorithm can be improved by
explore-then-exploit type algorithms, which has a slightly worse regret; (2) the state and action space depen-
dence in the regret can be reduced in the special case of one-step games via alternative mirror descent type
algorithms.
We believe this paper opens up many interesting directions for future work. For example, can we design
a computationally efficient algorithms that achieves O˜(√T ) regret? What are the optimal dependence of the
regret on (S,A,B) in multi-step games? Also, the present results only work in tabular games, and it would
be of interest to investigate if similar results can hold in presence of function approximation.
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A Proofs for Section 3
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Notation: To be clear from the context, we denote the upper bound and lower bound Qup and Qlow com-
puted at the k-th episode as Qup,k and Qlow,k, and policies computed and used at the k-th episode as µk and
νk.
Choice of bonus: βt = c
√
SH2ι/t for sufficient large absolute constant c.
Lemma 11 (ULCB). With probability at least 1− p, we have following bounds for any (s, a, b, h, k):
V up,kh (s) ≥ sup
µ
V µ,ν
k
h (s), Q
up,k
h (s, a, b) ≥ sup
µ
Qµ,ν
k
h (s, a, b) (9)
V low,kh (s) ≤ infν V
µk,ν
h (s), Q
low,k
h (s, a, b) ≤ infν Q
µk,ν
h (s, a, b) (10)
Proof. By symmetry, we only need to prove the statement (9). For each fixed k, we prove this by induction
from h = H + 1 to h = 1. For base case, we know at the (H + 1)-th step, V up,kH+1(s) = supµ V
µ,νk
H+1 (s) = 0.
Now, assume the left inequality in (9) holds for (h + 1)-th step, for the h-th step, we first recall the
updates for Q functions respectively:
Qup,kh (s, a, b) =min
{
rh(s, a, b) + [P̂
k
hV
up,k
h+1 ](s, a, b) + βt,H
}
sup
µ
Qµ,ν
k
h (s, a, b) =rh(s, a, b) + [Ph sup
µ
V µ,ν
k
h+1 ](s, a, b)
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In case of Qup,kh (s, a, b) = H , the right inequality in (9) clearly holds. Otherwise, we have:
Qup,kh (s, a, b)− sup
µ
Qµ,ν
k
h (s, a, b) =[P̂
k
hV
up,k
h+1 ](s, a, b)− [Pkh sup
µ
V µ,ν
k
h+1 ](s, a, b) + βt
=[P̂kh(V
up,k
h+1 − sup
µ
V µ,ν
k
h+1 )](s, a, b) − [(P̂kh − Ph) sup
µ
V µ,ν
k
h+1 ](s, a, b) + βt
Since P̂kh preserves the positivity, by induction assumption, we know the first term is positive. By Lemma
12, we know the second term ≥ −βt. This finishes the proof of the right inequality in (9).
To prove the left inequality in (9), again recall the updates for V functions respectively:
V up,kh (s) =µ
k
h(s)
⊤Qup,kh (s, ·, ·)νkh(s) = maxφ∈∆A φ
⊤Qup,kh (s, ·, ·)νkh(s)
sup
µ
V µ,ν
k
h (s) = maxφ∈∆A
φ⊤[sup
µ
Qµ,ν
k
h (s, ·, ·)]νkh(s)
where the first equation is by the definition of policy µk the algorithm picks. Therefore:
V up,kh (s)− sup
µ
V µ,ν
k
h (s) ≥ maxφ∈∆A φ
⊤[Qup,kh − sup
µ
Qµ,ν
k
h ](s, ·, ·)νkh(s) ≥ 0.
This finishes the proof.
Lemma 12 (Uniform Concentration). Consider value function class
Vh+1 = {V : Sh+1 → R | V (s) ∈ [0,H] for all s ∈ Sh+1}.
There exists an absolute constant c, with probability at least 1− p, we have:∣∣∣[(Pˆkh − Ph)V ](s, a, b)∣∣∣ ≤ c√SH2ι/Nkh (s, a, b) for all (s, a, b, k, h) and all V ∈ Vh+1.
Proof. We show this for one (s, a, b, k, h); the rest follows from a union bound over these indices (and
results in a larger logarithmic factor.) Throughout this proof we let c > 0 to be an absolute constant that
may vary from line to line.
Let Vε be an ε-covering of Vh+1 in the∞ norm (that is, for any V ∈ Vh+1 there exists V̂ ∈ Vε such that
sups |V (s) − V̂ (s)| ≤ ε.) We have |Vε| ≤ (1/ε)S , and by Hoeffding inequality and a union bound (over
both V̂ and Nkh ∈ [K]), we have with probability at least 1− p that∣∣∣∣∣ sup
V̂ ∈Vε
[
(Pˆkh − Ph)V̂
]∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
√
H2(S log(1/ε) + log(K/p))
Nkh (s, a, b)
.
Taking ε = c
√
H2Sι/K , the above implies that∣∣∣∣∣ sup
V̂ ∈Vε
[
(Pˆkh − Ph)V̂
]∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ c
√
H2Sι
Nkh (s, a, b)
.
Meanwhile, with this choice of ε, for any V ∈ Vh+1, there exists V̂ ∈ Vε such that sups |V (s)− V̂ (s)| ≤ ε,
and therefore ∣∣∣[(Pˆkh − Ph)V ]− [(Pˆkh − Ph)V̂ ]∣∣∣ ≤ 2ε = c
√
H2Sι
K
≤ c
√
H2Sι
Nkh (s, a, b)
.
Combining the preceding two bounds, we have that the desired concentration holds for all V ∈ Vh+1.
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Proof of Theorem 2. By Lemma 11, we know the regret,
Regret(K) =
K∑
k=1
[
sup
µ
V µ,ν
k
1 (s
k
1)− infν V
µk,ν
1 (s
k
1)
]
≤
K∑
k=1
[V up,k1 (s
k
1)− V low,k1 (sk1)]
On the other hand, by the updates in Algorithm 1, we have:
[V up,kh − V low,kh ](skh) =µkh(skh)⊤[Qup,kh −Qlow,kh ](skh, ·, ·)νkh(skh),
=[Qup,kh −Qlow,kh ](skh, akh, bkh) + ξkh
≤[P̂kh(V up,kh+1 − V low,kh+1 )](skh, akh, bkh) + 2βkh + ξkh
≤[P(V up,kh+1 − V low,kh+1 )](skh, akh, bkh) + 4βkh + ξkh
=(V up,kh+1 − V low,kh+1 )(skh+1) + 4βkh + ξkh + ζkh
the last inequality is due to Lemma 12. (Recall that βkh := βNkh (s
k
h
,ak
h
,bk
h
) = c
√
H2Sι/Nkh (s
k
h, a
k
h, b
k
h) when
Nkh ≥ 1. In the case when Nkh = 0, we can still define βkh = β0 := c
√
H2Sι, and the above inequality still
holds as we have Qup,kh −Qlow,kh = H ≤ β0.) Above, ξkh and ζkh are defined as
ξkh =Ea∼µk
h
(sk
h
),b∼νk
h
(sk
h
)[Q
up,k
h −Qlow,kh ](skh, a, b)− [Qup,kh −Qlow,kh ](skh, akh, bkh)
ζkh =Es∼Ph(·|skh,a
k
h
,bk
h
)[(V
up,k
h+1 − V low,kh+1 )](s)− [V up,kh+1 − V low,kh+1 )](skh+1)
Both ξkh and ζ
k
h are martingale difference sequence, therefore by the Azuma-Hoeffding inequality we have
with probability 1− p that ∑
k,h
ξkh ≤ O(
√
HTι) and
∑
k,h
ζkh ≤ O(
√
HTι).
Therefore, by our choice of bonus βt and the Pigeonhole principle, we have
K∑
k=1
[
V up,k1 (s
k
1)− V low,k1 (sk1)
]
≤
∑
k,h
(
4βkh + ξ
k
h + ζ
k
h
)
≤
∑
h,s∈Sh,a∈Ah,b∈Bh
c ·
NK
h
(s,a,b)∑
t=1
√
H2Sι
t
+O(
√
HTι)
=
∑
h,s∈Sh,a∈Ah,b∈Bh
O
(√
H2Sι ·NKh (s, a, b)
)
+O(
√
HTι)
≤
∑
h∈[H]
O
(√
H2S2AhBhKι
)
≤ O
(√
H4S2
[
max
h
AhBh
]
Kι
)
= O
(√
H3S2
[
max
h
AhBh
]
T ι
)
.
This finishes the proof.
A.2 Proof of Corollary 3
The proof is based on a standard online-to-batch conversion (e.g. (Section 3.1, Jin et al., 2018).) Let (µ̂k, ν̂k)
denote the policies deployed by the VI-ULCB algorithm in episode k. We sample µ̂, ν̂ uniformly as
µ̂ ∼ Unif{µ1, . . . , µK} and ν̂ ∼ Unif{ν1, . . . , νK}.
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Taking expectation with respect to this sampling gives
Eµ̂,ν̂
[
V †,ν̂(s1)− V µ̂,†(s1)
]
=
1
K
K∑
k=1
[
V †,ν
k
(s1)− V µk ,†(s1)
]
=
1
K
Regret(K) ≤ O˜
(√
H3S2ABT
K
)
≤ O˜
(√
H4S2AB
K
)
,
where we have applied Theorem 2 to bound the regret with high probability. ChoosingK ≥ O˜(H4S2AB/ǫ2),
the right hand side is upper bounded by ǫ, which finishes the proof.
B Proofs for Section 4
In this section, we prove Theorem 5 and Corollary 6 based on the following lemma about subroutine RE-
WARD FREE EXPLORATION. We will defer the proof of this Lemma to Appendix D.
Lemma 13. Under the preconditions of Theorem 5, with probability at least 1− p, for any policy µ, ν, we
have:
|Vˆ µ,ν1 (s1)− V µ,ν1 (s1)| ≤ ǫ/2 (11)
where Vˆ , V are the value functions ofMG(Pˆ, rˆ) andMG(P, r).
B.1 Proof of Theorem 5
Since both inf and sup are contractive maps, by Lemma 13, we have:
| inf
ν
V µˆ,ν1 (s1)− infν Vˆ
µˆ,ν
1 (s1)| ≤ ǫ/2
| sup
µ
V µ,νˆ1 (s1)− sup
µ
Vˆ µ,νˆ1 (s1)| ≤ ǫ/2
Since (µˆ, νˆ) are the Nash Equilibria forMG(Pˆ, rˆ), we have infν Vˆ
µˆ,ν
1 (s1) = supµ Vˆ
µ,νˆ
1 (s1). This gives:
sup
µ
V µ,νˆ1 (s1)− infν V
µˆ,ν
1 (s1) ≤| sup
µ
V µ,νˆ1 (s1)− sup
µ
Vˆ µ,νˆ1 (s1)|+ | sup
µ
Vˆ µ,νˆ1 (s1)− infν Vˆ
µˆ,ν
1 (s1)|
+ | inf
ν
Vˆ µˆ,ν1 (s1)− infν V
µˆ,ν
1 (s1)| ≤ ǫ.
which finishes the proof.
B.2 Proof of Corollary 6
Recall that Theorem 5 requires T0 = c(H
5S2ABι/ǫ2 + H7S4ABι3/ǫ) episodes to obtain an ǫ-optimal
policies in the sense:
sup
µ
V µ,νˆ1 (s1)− infν V
µˆ,ν
1 (s1) ≤ ǫ.
Therefore, if the agent plays the Markov game for T episodes, it can use first T0 episodes to explore to
find ǫ-optimal policies (µˆ, νˆ), and use the remaining T − T0 episodes to exploit (always play (µˆ, νˆ)). Then,
the total regret will be upper bounded by:
Regret(K) ≤ T0 × 1 + (T − T0)× ǫ
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Finally, choose
ǫ = max
{(
H5S2ABι
T
) 1
3
,
(
H7S4ABι3
T
) 1
2
}
we finishes the proof.
C Proofs for Section 5
C.1 Proof of Theorem 9
The theorem is almost an immediate consequence of the general result on mirror descent (Rakhlin and Sridharan,
2013). However, for completeness, we provide a self-contained proof here. The main ingredient in our proof
is to show that a “natural” loss estimator satisfies desirable properties—such as unbiasedness and bounded
variance—for the standard analysis of mirror descent type algorithms to go through.
Special case of S = 1 We first deal with the case of S = 1. As the game only has one step (H = 1),
it reduces to a zero-sum matrix game with a noisy bandit feedback, i.e. there is an unknown payoff matrix
R ∈ [0, 1]A×B , the algorithm plays policies (µk, νk) ∈ ∆A ×∆B , observes feedback r(ak, bk) = Rak ,bk
where (ak, bk) ∼ µk × νk, and the weak regret has form
WeakRegret(T ) = max
µ
T∑
k=1
µ⊤Rνk −min
ν
K∑
k=1
µ⊤kRν.
Note that this regret can be decomposed as
WeakRegret(T ) = max
µ
T∑
k=1
µ⊤Rνk −
T∑
k=1
µ⊤kRνk︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
+
T∑
k=1
µ⊤k Rνk −minν
T∑
k=1
µ⊤k Rν︸ ︷︷ ︸
II
.
We now describe the mirror descent algorithm for the max-player and show that it achieves bound I ≤
O˜(√AT ) regardless of the strategy of the min-player. A similar argument on the min-player will yield a
regret bound II ≤ O˜(√BT ) on the second part of the above regret and thus show WeakRegret(T ) ≤
O˜(√(A+B)T ).
For all k ∈ [T ], define the loss vector ℓk ∈ RA for the max-player as
ℓk(a) := e
⊤
a Rνk, for all a ∈ A.
With this definition the regret I can be written as
I = max
a
T∑
k=1
ℓk(a)−
T∑
k=1
µk(a)ℓk(a).
Now, define the loss estimate ℓ˜k(a) as
ℓ˜k(a) := 1−
1
{
ak = a
}
µk(a)
[
1− r(a, bk)
]
.
We now show that this loss estimate satisfies the following properties:
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(1) Computable: the reward r(a, bk) is seen when a = ak, and the loss estimate is equal to 1 for all a 6= ak.
(2) Bounded: we have ℓ˜k(a) ≤ 1 almost surely for all k and a.
(3) Unbiased estimate of ℓk(a). For any fixed state a ∈ A, we have
E
[
ℓ˜k(a)|Fk−1
]
= 1− µk(a) · 1
µk(a)
Ebk∼νk
[
1− r(a, bk)
]
= 1−
(
1− Ebk∼νk [r(a, bk)]
)
= Ebk∼νk [r(a, b
k)] = e⊤a Rνk = ℓk(a).
(4) Bounded variance: one can check that
E
[∑
a∈A
µk(a)ℓ˜k(a)
2
∣∣Fk−1
]
= Ebk∼νk
[∑
a∈A
µk(a)
(
1− 2
(
1− r(a, bk)
))
+
∑
a∈A
(1− r(a, bk))2
]
.
Letting ya := 1− r(a, bk), we have ya ∈ [0, 1] almost surely (though it is random), and thus∑
a
µk(a)(1 − 2ya) +
∑
a
y2a ≤ 1− 2mina ya +
∑
a
y2a =
∑
a6=a∗
y2a + (ya⋆ − 1)2 ≤ A,
where a⋆ = argmina∈A ya.
Therefore, adapting the proof of standard regret-based bounds for the mirror descent (EXP3) algorithm
(e.g. (Lattimore and Szepesva´ri, 2018, Theorem 11.1)), using the loss estimate ℓ˜k(a) and taking the step-
size to be η+ ≡
√
logA/AT , we have the regret bound
WeakRegret+ ≤ C ·
√
AT logA,
where C > 0 is an absolute constant. This shows the desired bound O˜(√AT ) for term I in the regret, and a
similar bound O˜(√BT ) holds for term II by using the same algorithm on the min-player.
Case of S > 1 The case of S > 1 can be viewed as S independent zero-sum matrix games. We can
let both players play the each matrix game independently using an adaptive step-size sequence (such as the
EXP3++ algorithm of Seldin and Slivkins (2014)) so that on the game with initial state s ∈ S they achieve
regret bound
O˜(
√
(A+B)Ts),
where Ts denotes the number of games that has context s. Summing the above over s ∈ S gives the regret
bound
WeakRegret(T ) ≤
∑
s
O˜(
√
(A+B)Ts) ≤ O˜(
√
S(A+B)T ),
as
∑
s Ts = T and thus
∑
s
√
Ts ≤
√
ST by Cauchy-Schwarz.
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Algorithm 3Mirror descent for one-step turn-based game
input Learning rate schedule (η+,k(s), η−,k(s)).
Initialize: Set (µ, ν) to be uniform: µ(a|s1) = 1A for all (s1, a) and ν(b|s2) = 1B for all (s2, b).
for episode k = 1, . . . ,K do
Receive s1.
Play action a ∼ µ(·|s1). Observe reward r1(s1, a) and next state s2.
Play action b ∼ ν(·|s2). Observe reward r2(s2, b).
Compute
{
Q˜k1(s
k
1 , a)
}
a∈A
according to (12) and update
µk+1(a|sk1) ∝ µk(a|sk1) · exp(η+,k(sk1)Q˜k1(sk1 , a)).
Compute
{
Q˜k2(s
k
2 , b)
}
b∈B
according to (13) and update
νk+1(b|sk2) ∝ νk(b|sk2) · exp(−η−,k(sk2)Q˜k2(sk2 , b)).
C.2 Proof of Theorem 10
We first describe our algorithm for one-step turn-based games (H = 2.) Note that this is not equivalent to a
zero-sum matrix game, as there is an unknown transition dynamics involved.
As both the max and min player only have one turn to play: µ = {µ1} and ν = {ν2}, in this section we
will abuse notation slightly and use (µ, ν) to denote (µ1, ν2). We will also use (A,B) to denote (A1,B2) for
similar reasons.
We now present our mirror descent based algorithm for one-step turn-based games. Define the loss
estimates
Q˜k1(s
k
1 , a) := 2−
1
{
ak = a
}
µk(a|sk1)
·
[
2− (r(sk1 , a) + r(sk2, bk))
]
for all a ∈ A, (12)
Q˜k2(s
k
2 , b) := 1−
1
{
bk = b
}
νk(b|sk2)
·
[
1− r(sk2, b)
]
for all b ∈ B. (13)
The full algorithm is described in Algorithm 3.
We are now in position to prove the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 10 We begin by decomposing the weak regret into two parts:
WeakRegret(T ) = max
µ
K∑
k=1
V µ,ν
k
1 (s
k
1)−minν
K∑
k=1
V µ
k ,ν
1 (s
k
1)
= max
µ
K∑
k=1
V µ,ν
k
1 (s
k
1)−
K∑
k=1
V µ
k ,νk
1 (s
k
1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
WeakRegret+
+
K∑
k=1
V µ
k ,νk
1 (s
k
1)−minν
K∑
k=1
V µ
k ,ν
1 (s
k
1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
WeakRegret−
.
In the following, we show that both WeakRegret+ ≤ O(
√
SATι) and WeakRegret− ≤ O(
√
SBTι),
which when combined gives the desired result.
21
Bounding WeakRegret+ We first consider the case that the initial state is fixed, i.e. s
k
1 ≡ s1 for some
fixed s1 ∈ S1 and all k. In this case, we have for any µ that
V µ,ν
k
1 (s1) =
∑
a∈A
µ(a|s1)Qµ,ν
k
1 (s1, a) =
〈
Qµ,ν
k
1 (s, ·), µ(·|s1)
〉
a
=
〈
Q·,ν
k
1 (s1, ·), µ(·|s1)
〉
a
.
Above, the last equality follows by the fact the max player will not play again after the initial action in
one-step games, i.e. Qµ,ν1 (s, a) does not depend on µ. Applying the above expression, WeakRegret+ can
be rewritten as
WeakRegret+ = maxµ
K∑
k=1
〈
Q·,ν
k
1 (s1, ·), µ(·|s1)
〉
a
−
K∑
k=1
〈
Q·,ν
k
1 (s1, ·), µk(·|s1)
〉
a
,
Therefore, boundingWeakRegret+ reduces to solving an online linear optimization problem over ∆A with
bandit feedback, where at each step we play µk and then suffer a linear loss with loss vector
{
Q·,ν
k
1 (s1, ·)
}
a∈A
.
Now, recall that our loss estimate in (12), adapted to the setting that sk1 ≡ s1 can be written as:
Q˜k1(s1, a) = 2−
1
{
ak = a
}
µk(a|s1) ·
[
2− (r(s1, a) + r(sk2, bk))
]
.
We now show that this loss estimate satisfies the following properties:
(1) Computable: the reward r(s1, a) is seen when a = a
k, and the loss estimate is equal to 2 for all other
a 6= ak.
(2) Bounded: we have Q˜k1(s1, a) ≤ 2 for all k and a.
(3) Unbiased estimate of Q·,ν
k
1 (s1, ·). For any fixed state a, when ak = a happens, sk2 is drawn from the
MDP transition P1(·|s1, a). Therefore, letting Fk−1 be the σ-algebra that encodes all the information
observed at the end of episode k − 1, we have that
Q˜k1(s1, a)|Fk−1 d= 2−
1
{
ak = a
}
µk(a|s1) ·
[
2− r(s1, a)− r(s(a)2 , b(a))
]
,
where
d
= denotes equal in distribution, s
(a)
2 ∼ P1(·|s1, a) is an “imaginary” state had we played action
a at step 1, and b(a) ∼ νk(·|s(a)2 ). Therefore we have
E
[
Q˜k1(s1, a)
∣∣∣Fk−1]
= Ea∼µk(·|s1)
[
2− 1 {a = a}
µk(a|s1) Es(a)2 ,b(a)
[
2− r(s1, a)− r(s(a)2 , b(a))
]]
= E
s
(a)
2 ,b
(a)
[
2− µ
k(a|s1)
µk(a|s1) ·
[
2− (r(s1, a) + r(s(a)2 , b(a)))
]]
= E
s
(a)
2 ,b
(a)[r(s1, a) + r(s
(a)
2 , b
(a))] = Q·,ν
k
1 (s1, a).
(4) Bounded variance: one can check that
E
[∑
a∈A
µk(a|s1)Q˜k1(s1, a)2
∣∣Fk−1
]
= 4
∑
a∈A
µk(a|s1)
(
1− E
s
(a)
2 ,b
(a) [2− r(s1, a)− r(s(a)2 , b(a))]
)
+
∑
a∈A
E
s
(a)
2 ,b
(a) [(2− r(s1, a)− r(s(a)2 , b(a)))2]
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Letting pa := µ
K(a|s1) and ya := 2−r(s1, a)−r(s(a)2 , b(a)2 ), we have ya ∈ [0, 2] almost surely (though
it is random), and thus
4
∑
a
pa(1− ya) +
∑
a
y2a ≤ 4(1 −mina ya) +
∑
a
y2a =
∑
a6=a∗
y2a + (ya∗ − 2)2 ≤ 4A,
where a∗ = argmina∈A ya.
Therefore, adapting the proof of standard regret-based bounds for the mirror descent (EXP3) algorithm
(e.g. (Lattimore and Szepesva´ri, 2018, Theorem 11.1)), taking η+ ≡
√
logA/AT , we have the regret bound
WeakRegret+ ≤ C ·
√
AT logA,
where C > 0 is an absolute constant.
In the general case where sk1 are not fixed and can be (in the worst case) adversarial, the design of
Algorithm 3 guarantees that for any s ∈ S , µ(·|s) gets updated after the k-th episode only if sk1 = s;
otherwise the µ(·|s) is left unchanged. Therefore, the algorithm behaves like solving S bandit problems
independently, so we can sum up all the one-state regret bounds of the above form and obtain that
WeakRegret+ ≤
∑
s∈S
C
√
ATs logA
(i)
≤ C
√
SAT logA = O(
√
SATι).
where Ts := #
{
k : sk1 = s
}
denotes the number of occurrences of s among all the initial states, and (i) uses
that
∑
s Ts = T and the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality (or pigeonhole principle). Note that we does not know
{Ts}s∈S before the algorithm starts to play and thus cannot use η+(s) =
√
logA/ATs. We instead use the
EXP3++ algorithm (Seldin and Slivkins, 2014) whose step-size η+,k(s) =
√
logA/ANk(s) is computable
at each episode k.
BoundingWeakRegret− For any ν define r(s2, ν(s2)) := Eb∼ν(·|s2)[r(s2, b)] for convenience. We have
WeakRegret− =
K∑
k=1
V µ
k,νk(sk1)−minν
K∑
k=1
V µ
k,ν(sk1)
=
K∑
k=1
Ea∼µk(·|s1)
[
r(sk1, a) + P1[r(s2, ν
k(s2))](s
k
1 , a)
]
−min
ν
K∑
k=1
Ea∼µk(·|s1)
[
r(sk1, a) + P1[r(s2, ν(s2))](s
k
1 , a)
]
(i)
= Ea∼µk(·|s1)
[
K∑
k=1
r(sk1, a) + P1[r(s2, ν
k(s2))](s
k
1 , a)
]
−
K∑
k=1
Ea∼µk(·|s1)
[
r(sk1, a) + P1[r(s2, ν
⋆(s2))](s
k
1 , a)
]
=
K∑
k=1
Ea∼µk(·|s1),s2∼P1(·|sk1 ,a)
[r(s2, ν
k(s2))− r(s2, ν⋆(s2))],
where (i) follows from the fact that if we define ν⋆(s2) = argminb′ r(s2, b
′), then ν⋆ is optimal at every
state s2 and thus also attains the minimum outside. Defining fk(s2) = r(s2, ν
k(s2)) − r(s2, ν⋆(s2)), we
have that fk(s2) ∈ [0, 1] and is a fixed function of s2 before playing episode k. Thus, if we define
∆k = Ea,s2 [fk(s2)]− fk(sk2),
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then∆k is a bounded martingale difference sequence adapted to Fk−1, so by the Azuma-Hoeffding inequal-
ity we have with probability at least 1− δ that∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
k=1
∆k
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ C√K log(1/δ) = C√T log(1/δ).
On this event, we have
WeakRegret− =
K∑
k=1
fk(s
k
2) +
K∑
k=1
∆k
≤
K∑
k=1
[
r(sk2, ν
k(s2))− r(s2, ν⋆(s2))
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
I
+C
√
K log(1/δ).
The first term above is the regret for the contextual bandit problem (with context s2) that the min player faces.
Further, the min player in Algorithm 3 plays the mirror descent (EXP3) algorithm independently for each
context s2. Therefore, by standard regret bounds for mirror descent (e.g. Theorem 11.1, (Lattimore and Szepesva´ri,
2018)) we have (choosing η− ≡
√
logB/T in the fixed s2 case, and using the EXP3++ scheduling (Seldin and Slivkins,
2014)) for the contextual case), we have
I ≤
∑
s∈S2
C
√
BTs logB ≤ C
√
SBT logB,
which combined with the above bound gives that with high probability
WeakRegret− ≤ O(
√
SBTι),
where ι = log(SABT/δ).
D Subroutine REWARD FREE EXPLORATION
In this section, we present the REWARD FREE EXPLORATION algorithm, as well as the proofs for Lemma
13. The algorithm and results presented in this section is simple adaptation of the algorithm in Jin et al.
(2020), which studies reward-free exploration in the single-agent MDP setting.
Since the guarantee of Lemma 13 only involves the evaluation of the value under fixed policies, it does
not matter whether players try to maximize the reward or minimize the reward. Therefore, to prove Lemma
13 in this section, with out loss of generality, we will treat this Markov game as a single player MDP, where
the agent take control of both players’ actions inMG. For simplicity, prove for the case S1 = S2 = · · · = SH ,
A1 = A2 = · · · = AH = A. It is straightforward to extend the proofs in this section to the setting where
those sets are not equal.
The algorithm is described in Algorithm 4, which consists of three loops. The first loop computes a set
of policies Ψ. By uniformly sampling policy within set Ψ, one is guaranteed visit all “significant” states
with reasonable probabilities. The second loop simply collecting data from such sampling procedure for N
episodes. The third loop computes empirical transition and empirical reward by averaging the observation
data collected in the second loop. We note Algorithm 4 use subroutine EULER, which is the algorithm
presented in Zanette and Brunskill (2019).
We can prove the following lemma, where Lemma 13 is a direct consequence of Lemma 14.
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Algorithm 4 REWARD FREE EXPLORATION
1: Input: iteration number N0, N .
2: set policy class Ψ← ∅, and dataset D ← ∅.
3: for all (s, h) ∈ S × [H] do
4: rh′(s
′, a′)← 1[s′ = s and h′ = h] for all (s′, a′, h′) ∈ S ×A× [H].
5: Φ(s,h) ← EULER(r,N0).
6: πh(·|s)← Uniform(A) for all π ∈ Φ(s,h).
7: Ψ← Ψ ∪ Φ(s,h).
8: for n = 1 . . . N do
9: sample policy π ∼ Uniform(Ψ).
10: playM using policy π, and observe the trajectory zn = (s1, a1, r1, . . . , sH , aH , rH , sH+1).
11: D ← D ∪ {zn}
12: for all (s, a, h) ∈ S ×A× [H] do
13: Nh(s, a)←
∑
(sh,ah)∈D
1[sh = s, ah = a].
14: Rh(s, a)←
∑
(sh,ah,rh)∈D
rh1[sh = s, ah = a].
15: rˆh(s, a)← Rh(s, a)/Nh(s, a).
16: for all s′ ∈ S do
17: Nh(s, a, s
′)←∑(sh,ah,sh+1)∈D 1[sh = s, ah = a, sh+1 = s′].
18: Pˆh(s
′|s, a)← Nh(s, a, s′)/Nh(s, a).
19: Return: empirical transition Pˆ, empirical reward rˆ.
Lemma 14. There exists absolute constant c > 0, for any ǫ > 0, p ∈ (0, 1), if we set N0 ≥ cS3AH6ι3/ǫ,
and N ≥ cH5S2Aι/ǫ2 where ι := log(SAH/(pǫ)), then with probability at least 1− p, for any policy π:
|Vˆ π1 (s1)− V π1 (s1)| ≤ ǫ/2
where Vˆ , V are the value functions ofMG(Pˆ, rˆ) andMG(P, r), and (Pˆ, rˆ) is the output of the algorithm 4.
Proof. The proof is almost the same as the proof of Lemma 3.6 in Jin et al. (2020) except that there is no
error in estimating r in Jin et al. (2020). We note the error introduced by the difference of rˆ and r is a same
or lower order term compared to the error introduced by the difference of Pˆ and P. We can bound the former
error using the similar treatment as in bounding the latter error. This finishes the proof.
E Connection to Algorithms against Adversarial Opponents and R-MAX
Similar to the standard arguments in online learning, we can use any algorithm with low regret against
adversarial opponent in Markov games to design a provable self-play algorithm with low regret.
Formally, suppose algorithm A has the following property. The max-player runs algorithm A and has
following guarantee:
max
µ
K∑
k=1
V µ,ν
k
1 (s
k
1)−
K∑
k=1
V µ
k ,νk
1 (s
k
1) ≤ f(S,A,B, T ) (14)
where {µk}Kk=1 are strategies played by the max-player, {νk}Kk=1 are the possibly adversarial strategies
played by the opponent, and function f is a regret bound depends on S,A,B, T . Then, by symmetry, we
can also let min-player runs the same algorithm A and obtain following guarantee:
K∑
k=1
V µ
k,νk
1 (s
k
1)−minν
K∑
k=1
V µ
k,ν
1 (s
k
1) ≤ f(S,B,A, T ).
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This directly gives a self-play algorithm with following regret guarantee
WeakRegret(T ) = max
µ
K∑
k=1
V µ,ν
k
1 (s
k
1)−minν
K∑
k=1
V µ
k ,ν
1 (s
k
1)
=max
µ
K∑
k=1
V µ,ν
k
1 (s
k
1)−
K∑
k=1
V µ
k ,νk
1 (s
k
1) +
K∑
k=1
V µ
k ,νk
1 (s
k
1)−minν
K∑
k=1
V µ
k ,ν
1 (s
k
1) ≤ f(S,A,B, T ) + f(S,B,A, T )
However, we note there are two notable cases, despite they are also results with guarantees against
adversarial opponent, their regret are not in the form (14), thus can not be used to give self-play algorithm,
and obtain regret bound in our setting.
The first case is R-MAX algorithm (Brafman and Tennenholtz, 2002), which studies Markov games,
with guarantees in the following form.
K∑
k=1
V µ
⋆,ν⋆
1 (s
k
1)−
K∑
k=1
V µ
k,νk
1 (s
k
1) ≤ g(S,A,B, T )
where {µk}Kk=1 are strategies played by the max-player, {νk}Kk=1 are the adversarial strategies played by the
opponent, (µ⋆, ν⋆) are the Nash equilibrium of the Markov game, g is a bound depends on S,A,B, T . We
note this guarantee is weaker than (14), and thus can not be used to obtain regret bound in the setting of this
paper.
The second case is algorithms designed for adversarial MDP (see e.g. Zimin and Neu, 2013; Rosenberg and Mansour,
2019; Jin et al., 2019), whose adversarial opponent can pick adversarial reward function. We note in Markov
games, the action of the opponent not only affects the reward received but also affects the transition to the
next state. Therefore, these results for adversaril MDP with adversarial rewards do not directly apply to the
setting of Markov game.
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